Abstract. When model checking a software component, a model of the environment in which that component is supposed to run is constructed. One of the major threats to the validity of this kind of analysis is the correctness of the environment model. In this paper, we identify and formalize a problem related to environment models -environment guarantees. It captures those cases where the correctness of the component under analysis is due solely to the model of its environment. Environment guarantees provides a model-based analog to a property-based notion of vacuity by identifying cases when the component is irrelevant to satisfaction of a property. The paper also presents a model checking technique for the detection of environment guarantees. We show the effectiveness of our technique by applying it to a previously published study of TCAS II, where it finds a number of environment guarantees.
Introduction
As software is controlling more and more critical aspects of our lives, its reliability is ever more important. Formal verification can help increase confidence in the software systems being built. Among the verification methods, model checking is gaining popularity due to its automated approach. In this approach, a model of the software component being analyzed is closed with a model of the environment in which the component is expected to run. Correctness properties of the component are then checked on the resulting model. One of the major threats to this kind of analysis is the correctness of the environment model. Creating a faithful model of the environment is error-prone, as often the environment consists of parts of the physical world whose behavior is only partially understood, or it is a complex system, e.g., an operating system, whose behavior is also hard to capture in a unified model. Moreover, the model of the environment is often simplified to enable effective model-checking, potentially leading to errors.
To illustrate the kinds of modeling errors we address, consider, for example, model checking a traffic light controller. In this system, cars arrive at an intersection, trip sensors, and wait for the green light. The controller, which is the component being analyzed, uses the sensors, that represent the environment, to maximize the flow of cars through the intersection. An essential property of the system is that if a sensor is ever tripped, an appropriate light eventually turns green. This property is formalized in CTL [10] (defined in Section 2) as IBM researchers generalized this notion to properties that are not necessarily implications, naming it vacuity [3] . The definition of vacuity is property-based: a formula is vacuous in a subformula ¡ in a given model if ¡ does not influence the value of in the model. That is, in the traffic light example above with the faulty environment model, the property is vacuous in Light=green: it is satisfied independently of the color of the light because the antecedent of the implication is false. [3] also defined a vacuity detection method for a restricted class of CTL formulas and noted that when found, vacuity always pointed to a problem in either the component, its environment, or in the property, which was observed for 20% of the properties checked. Other researchers [24, 1, 21] extended vacuity detection to general properties expressed in CTL and other common languages. All these approaches, however, remain property-based, and are not adequate to detect errors in the model. Vacuity information is not sufficient to decide when the environment model is faulty. Consider the property again -it is also vacuous in Light=green in a model where the activation of the sensors depends on a flag being set by the controller independently of the environment, and the controller never sets that flag. In this case, the vacuity is due to the component, and not to its environment, and is often not effective for finding problems with the model.
In contrast to the property-centric approach of vacuity detection, Shlyakhter et al. [30] devised a technique to debug models more directly. They identified the problem of "overconstraining" declarative models, and pointed out that overconstraining occurs most often in the definition of the models being checked rather than in the specification of their correctness properties. They have developed a technique for extracting and displaying the part of the model used for establishing satisfaction of a property. When most of the model was unnecessary to prove a property, the authors were able to conclude that was due to overconstraint, caused by subtle modeling errors. This technique, however, is restricted to declarative models, and does not exploit the view of the model that separates the component from its environment.
In our work, we also aim to provide a technique for model debugging, but in the case of operational models, such as those specified by state-machines, and we target the analysis toward debugging environment models. We consider a model to be "overconstrained" if a property that should hold of the software component in the given environment is guaranteed solely by the environment. In other words, the component can be replaced by another, arbitrary, component in the same environment, without affecting the satisfaction of the property. We say that such properties are environment guarantees. Environment guarantees always indicate a problem: either the desired property is not a property of the component, and should rather be reconsidered as a property of its environment, or there is an error in the model of the environment or in expressing the property. The naive approach to detect environment guarantees is to generate all possible components, compose each with the given environment, and check whether the property holds on all the composed models. This is clearly infeasible. Instead, we show how to model the environment as an open system and check properties on it directly, using a symbolic model-checking algorithm.
A similar approach, called robust satisfaction was proposed and studied in [23] . It is aiming to identify whether a property holds in all possible environments, and is the same as environment guarantees with the roles of the environment and the system reversed. While the method in [23] is complete (it always finds errors when they are present), it is rather expensive (see Section 7 for a detailed discussion). This paper makes the following contributions: (1) We argue that a way to discover faulty environment models is to detect cases where properties are guaranteed solely by the environment. Although this process does not find all possible environment modeling errors, the errors reported by this analysis always point to some error in understanding of the model-checking results. (2) We formalize the meaning of a property being guaranteed by the environment by modeling the environment as an open system. (3) We show how to model open systems and define a model-checking algorithm which can lead to a scalable technique for discovering environment guarantees. (4) We describe a simple implementation for checking environment guarantees for true universal properties. (5) We show that our technique finds real errors and is scalable for handling non-trivial systems by applying it to the well-known example of the Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS II) [26, 6] . In our case study, we found that several essential properties of TCAS II, including some analyzed by Chan et al. in [6] , hold as the result of environment guarantees: the model of the environment used in verifying this system has been simplified too much.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the relevant notation in Section 2, we formalize the meaning of a property being guaranteed by the environment in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the modeling and reasoning about open systems. While this framework is general, we do not currently have an implementation for checking for environment guarantees for arbitrary temporal logic properties. In Section 5, we describe the algorithm we have implemented for checking true universal properties. We illustrate effectiveness of checking for environment guarantees by analyzing true universal properties of the TCAS II system in Section 6. We compare our approach with related work, specifically, with vacuity detection and module checking, in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
Background
In this section, we review the model-checking process and fix the notation. [10] , the semantics of which is given in Figure 2 
Environment Guarantees
In this section, we formalize the notion of environment guarantees. A model described in Section 2 is a composition of the software component being analyzed, called the component from now on, with its environment. The boundary between them is often blurred during verification: they are simply specified using a collection of rules. In what follows, we make this boundary more explicit. We assume that the set of model variables is partitioned into a set of component variables and a set of environment variables. We further assume that this partition can be determined syntactically, (e.g., by the names or types of the variables, or their location, etc.), or by the model documentation. Environment variables represent the inputs to the software, coming from the environment. Component variables represent the outputs from the software to the environment. The variable partition induces a partition on the rules of a model into component rules and environment rules. Light would be guaranteed by the environment. In this case, it is obvious that the environment alone guarantees the property; in reallife models, however, such as the one considered in our case study (see Section 6), the intricate logic may hinder the easy detection of such environment guarantees.
To define when the environment satisfies a property, we construct all possible "closures" of the environment with component rules, and then use the standard semantics of temporal logic over the resulting closed models. In our example, one closure was shown earlier, where the component rule Lighto 
Environment Guarantees: Modeling and Algorithms
Given the environment rules, the rules closing them represent the behavior of a possible component in that environment. Intuitively, our notion of environment guarantee, given in Section 3, means that regardless of the component the environment is combined with, the resulting model still satisfies the property. This suggests the following naive approach to detecting environment guarantees: generate and model check all closures of the environment. Since there are exponentially many such closures, this approach is clearly infeasible. To solve this problem, in this section we use another representation of the environment that implicitly encodes all of its closures, and define a model-checking algorithm over this representation that checks all closures at once.
Logics for Open Systems
We aim to model open systems as state-transition graphs that can be model-checked directly. However, it is possible that an open system does not guarantee either the property, or its negation. That happens when the truth of the property depends on how the system is closed: in some closures the property is false; in the others, it is true.
Consider the model of the environment described in Section 3, with variables Sensor and Light and a single rule Sensoro r p q Sensor s
Light. Suppose we want to check a property that the sensor does not stay off for two consecutive states, e.g., if the sensor is off in a given state, it will be on in all of its next states, formalized as
Sensor . We check this property in a state where both the sensor and the light are on. Note that the rule of the environment guarantees that % is true, independently of Light. Therefore, this is an environment guarantee and will evaluate to true on all of the closures. On the other hand, consider a slightly different property: in any state, if the sensor is off, it remains off for one more time step, or
Sensor . In this case, we can find two closures of the environment that disagree on the value of this property. In one of them, the environment is closed with rule (1) Lighto p true, in the other -with (2) Lighto p false. With (1), in any state, after at most two steps, the sensor becomes on and stays on forever. With (2), the sensor alternates between on and off. If checked in a state where both the sensor and the light are on, $ is true in the first closure, but false in the second. In this case, we want the property to evaluate to "unknown" on the model of the environment alone, meaning that the environment by itself does not have enough knowledge to satisfy or refute the property. By this discussion, classical Kripke structures are not appropriate for modeling open systems since thay limit reasoning to only two values. Instead, structures defined using multi-valued logics have been employed for this task [5, 13] . In our approach, we use the four-valued logic, known as Belnap [4] (see Figure 3) , We use this logic instead of the 3-valued approach of [5] because it enables a more precise analysis by distinguishing between the partiality in the behaviour of the component and of the environment. We denote by¨the set of values and then the result is false. Figure 3 (c) presents a table for computing conjunction and negation of values of this logic. These operations are computed on the truth ordering pictured in Figure 3(a) , by using greatest lower bound for conjunction and symmetry for negation. We denote by¨the subset 
is a tuple ; (3) otherwise, the transition is false. The four-valued structure in Figure 1 (e) has been constructed using this algorithm.
Checking for Environment Guarantees
Our method for detecting whether the environment guarantees a property is as follows. Given the environment rules, (1) construct the associated four-valued Kripke structure (using Definition 6). (2) use the multi-valued model-checking algorithm to check the property on this structure. (3) if the algorithm answers © or , the property is guaranteed by the environment. An interpretation of CTL formulas over multi-valued Kripke structures and a corresponding model-checking algorithm have been defined [7] , and apply to our four-valued Kripke structures without modification. We illustrate how the property "there is a next state where the light is on", written as £ Light, is modelchecked in state of the structure in Figure 1(e) . This is expected, because this property evaluates to true in the first closure of our example, and to false in the second. Model-checking of other CTL operators uses the evaluation of , "eventually
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. If we check properties % and on the structure of Figure 1 (e) using this algorithm, we obtain © and , respectively. Our algorithm points to an environment guarantee if the property evaluates to either true or false, as it does for % .
Correctness
To show that the method presented in Section 4.3 is sound, we need to show that if the model-checking algorithm answers © , then all of the closures of the environment satisfy the property. In Section 3, we showed that each closed system is mapped to a classical Kripke structure. Thus, such a structure exists for every closure of the environment. For example, the structures for the two closures in our example are shown in Figure 1(b) Figure 1(b) and (c) are thus completions of that in Figure 1( 
Implementation
The multi-valued model-checking algorithm that reasons over four-valued Kripke structures has been implemented in a tool ¥ C hek [8] -a symbolic model-checker built on top of the state-of-the-art decision diagram library CUDD [31] . We can use ¥ C hek to check models of the environment directly or reduce the multi-valued model-checking problem to two classical ones, via a reduction described in [19] , and thus use a classical model-checker such as NuSMV [9] . In either case, this approach is more efficient than checking all possible closures of the environment.
Unfortunately, while ¥ C hek can provide an effective reasoning over models once they have been constructed, building such models from text-based descriptions remains a challenge. Specifically, the case study in Section 6 involved a model specified in SMV [9] , where the full generality of the SMV modeling language was used. In what follows, we discuss a simple implementation that can decide environment guarantees true ACTL formulas. An example ACTL property is
Light . Intuitively, since any ACTL property refers to "all paths", if it holds on the model with the most paths, it will hold on any model having a subset of those paths. It was shown in [19] that truth of ACTL properties can be decided by restricting the model-checking algorithm only to the transitions. In the four-valued structures we use to model open systems (see Section 4.2), a destination of an transition is always a boolean state. Thus, the reachable state space of a structure restricted to those transitions is completely boolean. Furthermore, this boolean structure corresponds to a composition of the environment with the component that changes its variables nondeterministically.
Let us consider the most nondeterministic component to be the one where all variables change nondeterministically, i.e., for every Correctness of using the most nondeterministic component for checking environment guarantees also follows from the fact that the closure of the environment with such component simulates all other closures of that environment. For instance, the Kripke structure in Figure 1(d) is a simulation of models in Figure 1(a)-(c) . By [18] , simulation preserves true ACTL properties, giving us a correct algorithm. Because of the duality of CTL operators, the same result holds for false existential properties. The most nondeterministic environment is routinely used for checking correctness of true universal properties of the component, e.g., [16] . However, we believe we are the first to propose the use of this technique for finding environment guarantees. The composition between the environment and the most nondeterministic component is trivial to construct syntactically from a text-based description of a system. Specifically, we have implemented this method for the modeling language of NuSMV, to facilitate reasoning about the TCAS II system (see Section 6). The language of NuSMV is similar to ours, and its semantics is such that if for any variable a rule is not given, the variable is assumed to change nondeterministically. Thus, to implement the detection of environment guarantees for true ACTL properties, it suffices to remove the component rules from a model 1 , and then check the properties on the remaining model using NuSMV [9] . The implementation is also highly efficient: increasing nondeterminism reduces the sizes of the decision diagrams used by NuSMV, and hence its running time.
Case Study: Checking the TCAS II System
We illustrate our approach with the Traffic Collision Avoidance System, TCAS II [32] . TCAS II implements a protocol for conflict detection and resolution between an aircraft 1 If the language did not have this default semantics, we would have to also insert rules 
the performance of the check in terms of time and BDD node allocation, on the full model (Full) and the environment alone (Env.). Next, we verified a property which we expect to hold in any aircraft controller system: no aircraft can immediately switch from increasing the rate of climbing to increasing the rate of descending, i.e., an aircraft must stop climbing before descending. The model defines macros i x
to encode the respective resolution advisories, which we used to formulate the question (row 2 in Table 1 ). It also passed in both the original model and the environment only, hence being guaranteed by the environment. This confirms the modeling error we have noticed before, i.e., that Other Aircraft controls the resolution advisories of Own Aircraft.
We also checked whether it is possible for the direction (up or down) 2 . Upon manual inspection of the counterexample produced by the model-checker, the environment model was identified as the cause of the violation, and it was fixed so that the property finally passed. Thus, we have evidence to believe that false universal properties exist "in the wild", and detecting environment guarantees for those is a worthwhile task which would eliminate the manual analysis of the counterexample. A yet more important class of properties to handle is CTL properties with mixed path quantifiers. For example, it is conceivable to demand that a reactive system can always be reset. One way to implement it is to have an initial state Init and require a property £ ¦ ¥ Init, i.e., from every state of the system, state Init is always reachable. Whether such a property holds or fails, a counterexample for it cannot be generated, and a special-purpose technique for detecting environment guarantees, such as the one proposed in Section 4 is required. We leave implementing a technique for checking environment guarantees of arbitrary CTL properties for future work.
Related Work and Discussion
The original definition of vacuity attempted to capture the conditions under which satisfaction of a property in the model does not indicate that the model behaves correctly. This definition was motivated by practical experience at the IBM Haifa Research Lab in applying model-checking to verifying hardware systems [3] . This definition was developed in a context of a rather restricted fragment of a temporal logic, in which a property is divided between a stimulus provided by the environment and an expected response of the component. In this context, this work provided an efficient algorithm for vacuity detection that identifies errors in practice. However, it does not work for more general properties and when the placed assumptions are not satisfied.
Over the years, the algorithm for vacuity has been generalized and extended to various temporal logics, e.g, see [24, 3, 1, 20, 21, 28] , and several tools [29, 15] have been implemented. However, this work has concentrated on the technical definition of vacuity -i.e., whether every subformula of a property is important for it satisfaction. Without additional assumptions used by Beer et al., these techniques can produce false positives, i.e., cases of vacuity that are not indicative of errors in the system. Instead of detecting trivial satisfaction, they indicate when a property can be simplified. Although this may be useful for model-checking, by itself it does not help in identifying problems.
For example, consider the property
from Section 1. It is vacuous in Sensor Tripped in a model where the light changes color periodically, whether there is a car waiting at the intersection or not. Thus, a stronger property,
, holds in the model, but does not necessarily signal any errors. Suppose that was given by the requirements stakeholder for creating a more optimal traffic controller system, and the model is just one implementation of the controller that does not require the assumption of the sensor being tripped. Another example is when Sensor Tripped is under the control of the component (and not the environment), so vacuity in it may not lead to a problem either: the controller might have some values of the sensor hard-coded into it, just to make sure that the rest of the controller behaves correctly. We refer to such cases as property overengineering -requiring a property that is weaker than the one that actually holds in the model by making potentially unnecessary assumptions about the environment or the state of the system. Industrial experience [12] indicates that properties are hard to get right. This process is expensive, and the properties, once deemed correct and validated with all stakeholders, remain fixed throughout the duration of the project, and even between different releases of the system. So, engineers are often reluctant to modify overengineered properties, and vacuity reports that point to such cases only distract from finding real problems.
In this paper, we have shown that Kripke structures based on 4-valued Belnap logic can be used to approximate open systems. Godefroid [17] has also proposed to use multi-valued logic, in his case, 3-valued Kleene logic, to model open systems. He shows that under an assumption that the component can block the environment, his 3-valued model-checking technique is equivalent to module-checking. However, we believe that this assumption is highly unrealistic -a component can interact with the environment, but cannot deter its progress.
The setting of work on robust satisfaction [23] is similar to ours: given a system , determining whether a property holds in all environments composed with under synchronous parallelism (for environment guarantees, the roles of the system and the environment are reversed). This algorithm is complete, and the authors note that for checking satisfaction of ACTL, robust satisfaction has the same complexity as modelchecking and can be decided using the same implementation as ours. For other properties, robust satisfaction is exponentially more expensive than model-checking. In contrast, our algorithm is partial, i.e., in some cases it may fail to detect that a property is guaranteed by the environment, but is of the same complexity as model-checking.
Module checking [25] is similar to robust satisfaction, but is defined over asynchronous composition. It has the same complexity as model-checking for true ACTL properties as well as for reachability (
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) and universal reachability (C
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). We plan to use this approach for detecting environment guarantees in asynchronous systems.
The work of [30] is the closest to ours in spirit: determining which part of the model is needed for checking the correctness property can alert the user to the presence of an overconstraint in their declarative models and help him/her locate its source. As in our case, the algorithm of [30] is efficient but not complete, and the authors report of several overconstraints that were not detectable by it.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we argued for the need to provide support for debugging environment models used in model-checking software systems. Specifically, we noted that when the environment single-handedly guarantees a (truth or falsity of) property which is expected of the component, then either the property should be reconsidered as one of the environment, or there is an error in the model of the environment. We have called this problem environment guarantees and argued that it can be found if the environment is modelled as an open system. We also discussed how to construct open models of the environment from rule-based descriptions of state-machine models, such as those created by SMV specifications, and implemented this technique for checking whether true ACTL properties are guaranteed by the environment. We reported our experience with a model of the TCAS II system which showed that environment guarantees present a real threat, especially when the modeler attempts to create abstractions of their systems to overcome the state explosion problem of model-checking. We also argued that the problem is not limited to true ACTL properties, and while we have theoretical decision procedure for arbitrary CTL properties, implementing it and comparing its performance against an implementation of robust satisfaction [23] is left for future work.
Our work opens a number of questions related to debugging models of the environment: (1) We assumed that every variable belongs to the environment or to the component (but not both), i.e., the environment and the component do not have shared variables. Moreover, we considered only cases of synchronous parallelism between the two. To make our approach applicable to more general domains, we plan to address these limitations. (2) Clearly, there are environments that may not guarantee a property by themselves; however, there are additional constraints imposed on them by components, i.e., via communication channels, that lead to environment guarantees. We intend to study this problem in future work. (3) We also assumed that there is a clear separation between the component and its environment, and thus the environment can be captured and its model constructed. This may not always be the case. For example, we may aim to verify a collection of components compositionally, so while checking one component, all remaining ones form its environment. This environment might be simply too big to analyze. There might also be cases when the component is composed with multiple environments, or when determining what constitutes an environment is difficult. One potential direction to remedy these problems is to follow the approach of Shlyakhter et al. [30] , aimed at computing and highlighting the part of the overall system on which the property depends. The user can then see whether the highlighted part is the environment and decide whether this constitutes a problem. Of course, highlighting is useful even when the boundary between the component and the environment is well understood: it points the user to the part of the environment that is entirely responsible for satisfying the desired property, facilitating debugging.
